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Abstract 
Political risk is expected to increase due to emerging markets’ increasing influence on the 
world economy. We identify Legal, Tension, Conflict, and Policy as underlying dimensions 
through Principal Component Analysis, using a disaggregated political risk index. Using a 
two-way error correction model Ethnic and Religious Tension is identified as a new and 
distinct dimension of political risk. Consequently, global investors are likely to benefit from 
understanding which dimension implies a reward. Investors in particular should direct their 
attention towards Tension, which seems to command a risk premium regardless of both 
market and time 
 
Keywords: Political risk, Developed and emerging markets, Principal Component Analysis, 
Ethnic tensions, Religious tensions 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investments have grown over the past few decades (Jakobsen, 2012a). The rate 
of growth in emerging markets has proven to be even more pronounced, although the majority 
of foreign direct investments still flow to developed countries (Bilson et al., 2001). The 
world’s economic growth as such is increasingly driven by emerging markets (Bremmer and 
Keat, 2010), where political risk is considered to be of increased importance (Diamonte et al., 
1996; Bilson et al., 2002; Bremmer & Keat, 2010). Political risk is further expected to 
increase due to emerging markets’ increasing influence on the world economy (Bremmer, 
2012). One particular theme of interest to investors is the increasing magnitude of social 
upheaval and unrest that is also expected to increase going forward (ILO, 2017). Hence, 
increasing globalisation in conjunction with political risk is of great importance to global 
investors and a challenge worth studying in considerable detail.  
Political risk is broadly defined by Jakobsen (2012b, p. 13) as ‘those events, actions, 
processes or characteristics of a socio-political nature that have the potential to - directly or 
indirectly - significantly and negatively affect the goals of foreign direct investors’. 
According to standard portfolio theory, increased risk should lead to greater returns. Political 
risk is likely to violate this classical risk-return relation, as countries considered to be 
politically more at risk have been shown to receive lower returns than politically safer 
countries (Erb et al.,1996a; Diamonte et al., 1996). Recent studies confirm these findings. On 
the other hand, Erb et al. (1996a) and Bilson et al. (2002) suggest that political risk does have 
a positive effect on stock market returns. Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015) refer to this 
ongoing dispute as a political risk sign paradox. This inconclusiveness also applies to the 
empirical literature investigating the impact of political risk on foreign direct investments. 
Jakobsen (2010, 2012a) suggests that this emanates from an under-prioritisation of the 
increasingly multidimensional phenomenon of political risk.  
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Despite its importance, the multidimensional nature political risk is somewhat 
understudied. Two notable exceptions are Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015) and Dimic et al. 
(2015) who provide some insight into the underlying dimensions of political risk and their 
impact on stock market returns. However, as far as we know, no one has estimated the 
underlying dimensions of political risk using an econometric approach to investigate the 
effect on stock market returns. Being aware of the multidimensional nature of political risk, 
this study aims to identify whether underlying dimensions of political risk affect stock market 
excess returns differently and to contribute to an understanding of the political risk sign 
paradox. We suggest that an aggregated political risk measure sweeps away the potentially 
conflicting effects of underlying dimensions of political risk (Harvey, 2004; Jakobsen, 2012a; 
Berggren et al., 2012; Lam & Zhang, 2014) since it is unlikely that all political risk 
components are equally linked to stock market returns (Berggren et al., 2015). Hence, 
knowledge concerning compensation for bearing different types of political risk is of great 
importance for global investors.  
 
The main research question is: How are stock market excess returns affected by underlying 
dimensions of political risk?  
 
Our econometric analysis identifies Legal, Tension, Conflict, and Policy as the underlying 
dimensions of political risk and demonstrate the increasing importance of Ethnic and 
Religious Tension (Tension) as a distinct risk dimension likely to influence financial markets 
going forward.  
We contribute to existing research in two distinct ways. First, by means of Principal 
Component Analysis we disentangle the underlying dimensions of political risk in order to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of how they differ in their impact on stock market returns 
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thus identifying a novel and distinct dimension stemming from religious and ethnic tension. 
Second, we analyse the extent to which the political risk dimensions affect excess returns 
differently under different market types (e.g. developed vs emerging markets) and over time, 
in order to determine which political risk is rewarded, with a particular emphasis on religious 
and ethnic tensions. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises previous research. Section 3 
provides information regarding the data and methodology, while section 4 presents our 
analysis and findings. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature   
Political instability has proven to be an important determinant of stock market performance. 
Previous research suggests that higher political risk is associated with higher expected returns 
(Erb et al., 1996a; Erb et al., 1996b; Bilson et al., 2002; Harvey, 2004). However, in some 
cases political risk has proven to violate this classical risk-return relation (Erb et al., 1996a; 
Diamonte, 1996; Perotti & van Oijen, 2001; Lehkonen & Heimonen, 2015; Dimic et al., 
2015). Lehkonen & Heimonen (2015) refer to this ongoing dispute as a political risk sign 
paradox.  
The existing literature is inconclusive with respect to the direction of the effect of 
political risk on financial markets. On the one hand, empirical evidence suggests a negative 
political risk premium, implying that investors are likely to accept reduced returns to hedge 
against political uncertainty (Brogaard & Detzel, 2015). On the other hand, others suggest a 
positive premium in support of the classical risk-return relation (Lam & Zhang, 2014). 
However, high political risk along one dimension could outperform low political risk in 
another, and vice versa (Jakobsen, 2012a). Such complexity calls for a consideration of the 
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underlying dimensions of political risk and their impact on stock market excess returns 
because previous research has primarily considered an aggregated and highly 
multidimensional Political Risk Index. In other words, different dimensions of political risk 
could be seen as orthogonal to each other, hence representing vastly different effects on 
market return.  
Our study builds on previous work emphasizing the importance of different 
underlying dimensions of political risk. In several analyses, Lam and Zhang (2014) identify 
the political risk components ‘Bureaucracy Quality’ and ‘Government Stability’ as distinct 
dimensions of political risk. The former (latter) dimension commands a risk premium in the 
emerging (developed) markets. Harvey (2004) includes several components of political risk, 
implicitly treating each as a distinct dimension. In contrast to the aggregated Political Risk 
Index (PRI), several of the components imply positive hedge returns in the emerging markets, 
especially in cases of ‘Government Stability’, ‘Investment Profile’, and ‘Internal Conflict’. 
When investigating sub-groups of political risk, as defined by Bekaert et al. (2005, 2014), in 
addition to political risk components, both are suggested as being unique to specific markets 
(Dimic et al., 2015). However, tensions are associated with lower stock market returns in less 
developed markets. Hence, the sub-group ‘Tensions and Conflicts’ seems to violate the 
classical risk-return relation when the level of democracy is not taken into account (Lehkonen 
& Heimonen, 2015), supporting Pástor and Veronesi (2013), who suggest that the political 
risk premium is economic state dependent. Berggren et al. (2012) detect a negative 
relationship between the ‘Social Congruence’ dimension of political risk and growth in rich 
countries. Furthermore, improvements in ‘Legal’ and ‘Policy’ are suggested to be positively 
related to growth in rich countries, whereas instability hampers growth in poor countries. The 
positive relation in terms of ‘Policy’ further turns out to correlate positively with the 
instability of policies (Berggren et al., 2015). In summary, the social aspect of political risk 
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seems to be an important underlying dimension that affects the stock market differently 
dependent upon the country’s macroeconomic state, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Underlying dimensions of political risk affect stock market excess returns differently 
between markets 
 
In addition to the cross-sectional effect from the state dependent nature of political risk, 
another branch of literature considers the time-variation in the same relationship. Arguably, 
the emerging market is becoming politically more secure, whereas the developed market is 
becoming politically riskier (Erb et al., 1996a; Harvey, 2004; Dimic et al., 2015). This 
phenomenon is referred to by Diamonte et al. (1996) as a global convergence. Consequently, 
the effect of political risk on financial markets are expected to vary over time. In association 
with a global convergence, and the fact that the classical risk-return relation in terms of 
political risk is considered a relatively recent phenomenon (Bilson et al., 2002; Lam & Zhang, 
2014), we propose a further hypothesis:  
 
H2: The underlying dimensions of political risk affect stock market excess return differently 
over time. 
 
3. Data and methods 
Our particular research question calls for a two-step research process; first we carve out four 
principal components from the political risk data from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). We then analyse these factors in a two-way error component model.  
3.1. Data and variable description 
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The final sample size comprises 28 countries covering June 2001 to May 2015. Fifteen of the 
28 countries are considered developed, and 13 are considered emerging (table 4 in Appendix 
1), according to well established classification (MSCI, 2016). To isolate the global financial 
crisis of 2008/2009, the sub-periods can be interpreted as pre-crisis (06/01-12/06), during-
crisis (01/07-12/10), and post-crisis (01/11-05/15), including monthly observations.  
Dependent Variable – excess return 
Broad market indices are chosen to capture the movement of the country’s entire market. 
Returns are derived from monthly observations. The indices are measured in USD according 
to availability and comparability, reflecting the perspective of global investors. In line with 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) we use market-specific excess return as our 
dependent variable. This is constructed by subtracting the risk-free rate (proxied by the 10 
year US Treasury Bond Rate) from the return of the Morgan Stanley index for the focal 
market.i  
 
Independent variable - Political Risk 
This study makes use of the disaggregated PRI included in ICRG, published by the PRS 
Group. The guide provides a monthly rating covering 141 countries including three sub-
categories of country-specific risk: political, financial, and economic. The ratings are 
estimated based on subjective staff analyses and are thus considered to be a forward-looking 
measure making it predictive by nature (Bilson et al., 2002) and further, suitable for stock 
market analysis. The components are aggregated into the PRI. The maximum rating on the 
PRI is 100. In each case, a lower (higher) risk rating reflects a higher (lower) risk. 
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Control variables 
Table 4 in Appendix 1 presents a detailed description of the sources of our control variables. 
The growth rate of Industrial Production (IP) is obtained by monthly observations, 
computing the first difference in the logarithm, and include seasonally adjusted data (index 
2010 = 100). The variable is lagged by two months as suggested by Chen et al. (1986) and 
Bilson et al. (2001).  
Inflation (CPI) is estimated as the lagged first difference in the logarithm of the 
consumer price index and include seasonal adjustments (index 2010 = 100). The lagged 
variable represents short-term inflation expectations rather than the actual inflation. 
Risk Premium (RP) is estimated so as to capture the effect of changes in risk aversion 
and is estimated by subtracting the 10-year US Treasury Bond Rate from the MSCI All 
Country World Index (ACWI) as a proxy for the global market portfolio. To estimate the 
unanticipated movement, the moving 12-month average risk premium is subtracted each 
month.  
To capture the influence of the shape of the Term Structure (TS), we subtract the 
previous month’s short-term interest rate from the current month’s long-term interest rate. 
The interest rates are converted from annual to monthly rates 
 
3.2. Approach Step One: Principal Component Analysis 
We perform PCA on standardised data rather than mean-corrected data because we do not 
assume that a component’s variance indicates its importance when forming the PRI. The 
analysis is performed on the pooled sample because our prime interest is the overall grouping 
of components. We extract four principal components according to the “eigenvalue-greater-
than-one” rule and a logical interpretation, resulting in a total variance explanation of 
10 
 
approximately 73%. They will henceforth be referred to as ‘underlying dimensions of 
political risk’. When interpreting the principal components, we consider the rotated 
component matrix in Table 1, rotated by varimaxii with Kaiser normalisation, in line with Toft 
(2008) and Berggren et al. (2012).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis 
Political Risk Components Principal Components  
 LEGAL TENSION CONFLICT POLICY Uniqueness 
Bureaucracy Quality  .859 .133 .094 .218 .188 
Corruption  .829 .133 .186 .200 .221 
Democratic Accountability  .723 .063 .040 -.305 .378 
Ethnic Tensions  .113 .805 -.104 .009 .328 
External Conflict  .005 -.162 .860 .015 .233 
Government Stability -.037 -.042 .004 .870 .239 
Internal Conflict  .328 .384 .606 .414 .206 
Investment Profile  .404 .303 .237 .539 .399 
Law and Order  .789 .322 .205 .096 .223 
Military in Politics  .426 .353 .665 .006 .252 
Religious Tensions  .249 .785 .203 .111 .268 
Socioeconomic Conditions   .568 .326 .062 .471 .345 
 
Notes: Loadings and uniqueness. The rotated component matrix, using varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization, is estimated out of the disaggregated Political Risk Index (International Country Risk 
Guide). Loadings in boldface are referred to as ‘heavy loadings’ in the text, using 0.5 as cut-off. 
 
The twelve political risk components split nicely into four underlying dimensions of political 
risk. The components have a considerable amount in common with their respective 
dimensions as all of their uniqueness is below 0.4. Hence, the multidimensional phenomenon 
of political risk seems to prove applicable for the PRI of ICRG.  
The dimensions are supported by both theoretical and empirical research. Moreover, 
the dimensions are comparable with the dimensions obtained in Berggren et al. (2012, 2015), 
implicitly suggesting that the correlations between the components are relatively constant 
over time because our sample includes more recent data. However, unlike this earlier work 
(2015), we include a fourth dimension with heavy loadings from Ethnic and Religious 
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Tensions. When we interpret the principal components restricted to three dimensions, the 
additional dimension, normally observed as separate from the others and independent of the 
rotation technique and sample specifications, is lost. Hence, four dimensions are preferable 
because the additional dimension is distinct and highly robust. This implies that Ethnic and 
Religious Tensions have become more important in recent years, which may be a result of 
increased globalisation, leading to the increased effects of political risk evolving from 
tensions. Furthermore, terror-related incidents have increased in the 21st century, driven by 
ethnic and, especially, religious tensions. Hence, adding a fourth component is a contribution 
to the understanding of political risk. 
The political risk components with heavy loadings on the first dimension are 
Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Law and Order, and 
Socioeconomic Conditions, all of which measure the quality of a country’s legal system and 
its consequences (Howell, 2011). This dimension is highly correlated with Rule of Law from 
other  (The World Justice Project, 2016), and bears similarities to the ‘Political Institutions’ 
dimension included in Jakobsen (2012a) and both ‘Quality and Institutions’ and ‘Democratic 
Tendencies’, suggested by Bekaert et al. (2005, 2014). Moreover, the dimension is similar to 
the ‘Legal’ dimension of Berggren et al. (2012) and the ‘Legal-administrative’ dimension of 
Berggren et al. (2015). Hence, the dimension is interpreted as Legal.  
The middle dimensions obtain heavy loadings from Ethnic and Religious Tensions in 
addition to Military in Politics, External Conflict, and Internal Conflict, all of which reflect 
unrest. They are comparable to the ‘Social Congruence’ dimension suggested in Berggren et 
al. (2012), the ‘Social Harmony’ dimension in Berggren et al. (2015), and the sub-group of 
‘Conflicts’ suggested in Bekaert et al. (2005, 2014). The second dimension is interpreted as 
Tension, and the third is interpreted as Conflict. Tension is observed to correlate relatively 
highly with the fractionalisation data in terms of ‘Ethnic’ and ‘Language’ (Alesina et al. 
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2003). Hence, Tension could be interpreted as an important determinant of political economy, 
reflecting instability, social unrest, and political violence (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). Conflict is 
seen to correlate weakly with the data. The finding as such provides support whereby the 
middle dimensions indeed reflect two distinct dimensions, unlike previous research which 
highlights the social aspect of political risk in general. Both Tension and Conflict are 
considered sources of risk because they are indicators of ‘future trouble’ (Jakobsen, 2012a), 
indicating a lagged effect with respect to the influence on stock market returns. However, 
Jakobsen (2012b) recommends looking into both contemporary and recent history. Hence, 
both Tension and Conflict are lagged by only one month.  
The fourth dimension obtains considerable loadings from Government Stability and 
Investment Profile, similar to the sub-group ‘Government Actions’ of Bekaert et al. (2005, 
2014). The former component reflects the government's ability to declare its programme and 
to stay in office (Howell, 2011). The latter component is a measure of contract viability, profit 
repatriation, and payment delays (Howell, 2011). The component influences the ‘Economic 
Governance’ dimension used in Jakobsen (2012a). The dimension correlates relatively highly 
with the categories ‘Rule of Law’, ‘Regulatory Efficiency’, and ‘Open Markets’ from Index 
of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation, 2016). This dimension is further identical 
with the ‘Policy’ dimension in Berggren et al. (2012) and is thus interpreted as Policy. 
Summary statistics from the pooled sample, including the twelve political risk 
components, are presented in Table 5 in Appendix 2.   
 
3.3. Approach step two: Two-way Error Component Model 
We specify a linear model, assuming both factors (entity in terms of market or country and 
time) and covariates (the independent variables) are linearly related to the dependent variable. 
Additionally, we cannot ignore the presence of entity-specific or time-specific fixed effects. 
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Hence, we operate with a two-way error component model that allows both entity-fixed and 
time-fixed effects within the same model using maximum likelihood (Brooks, 2008). 
Including interaction terms between factors and covariates allows us to investigate whether 
the linear relation between an underlying dimension of political risk and the dependent 
variable varies by entity or over time. The market type (e.g. developed market) fixed effect is 
used to test the first hypothesis. Hence, the absence of fixed effects within countries included 
in each market are implicitly assumed, which could lead to a country bias. We therefore also 
test for country-fixed effectsiii.  
To investigate how underlying dimensions of political risk affect stock market excess 
returns, we expand the multifactor model of Chen et al. (1986) with principal components 
extracted through a PCA. The factors included in the model of Chen et al. (1986) are sources 
of systematic asset risk, defined as economic state variables, consistent with the arbitrage 
pricing theory introduced by Ross (1976). We suggest underlying dimensions of political risk 
as economic state variables, systematically affecting stock market returns. Only the factor-
specific loadings are considered and not the factor prices following Fama and MacBeth 
(1973), as in Chen et al. (1986). We estimate an equation of the form  
 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘
+∑𝛾𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗
+ 𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
where 𝛼 is the overall constant term, and 𝛽𝑘 are factor-specific loadings on the state variables 
of Chen et al. (1986); 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡, and 𝛾𝑗  are underlying dimensions of political risk; 𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡. k denotes 
the presence of certain macroeconomic variables (e.g. CPI), while j refers to the four principal 
components (e.g. tension). 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 (𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡) denotes an interaction term creating entity-specific 
(time-specific) betas, 𝜇𝑖 (𝜆𝑡) denotes a dummy for entity (time), and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the remainder 
error term after subtracting both entity- and time-fixed effects; i and t denote country and 
months, respectively, and are operationalized by introducing a dummy for each country and 
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year less one. Regarding the interaction terms, M and P denote markets (i.e. developed or 
emerging) and sub-periods (i.e. pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis), respectively, 
whereas j again refers to the four dimensions of political risk (e.g. tension). The interaction 
terms are constructed using dummies for developed market and the during-crisis and post-
crisis periods (M and P), multiplied with each of the political risk factors. The estimated 
coefficients of the market-specific interaction term (𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡) captures the difference in the effect 
of the political risk factors on excess returns in different market types (i.e. developed or 
emerging). In other words, these show whether the political risk – excess return relationship – 
is moderated by the market type to which the country belongs.   
𝛿𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑀 = 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑀 
Similarly, the time-specific interaction term (𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡) captures the moderating effect of the 
different sub-periods (i.e. pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis).  
𝜌𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑃 = 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐶 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐶
+ 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑃𝐶 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑃𝐶 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑃𝐶 
Note that these parameters are essential in our investigation into the differing effects of 
political risk between markets and over time. Figure 1 sums up the empirical model for this 
paper. 
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Figure 1: Empirical model with PCA (P1-P4), controls (grey circles) and moderating effects (period 
and market) 
 
4. Analysis and findings 
4.1. Analysis step one: Analysis of the components 
We perform two distinct preliminary analyses in line with Harvey (2004).iv First, we perform 
an ex-ante analysis of the relation between the average return and the average disaggregated 
PRI. Two portfolios are constructed based on the risk level, low- and high-risk portfolios, 
using the cut-off points suggested by the PRS Group; low risk (high rating): 80-100% and 
high-risk (low rating): 0-70% (Howell, 2011). The hedge portfolio reflects a long position in 
the high-risk portfolio and a short position in the low-risk portfolio. Hence, a positive return 
in the hedge portfolio indicates a reward of political risk.  
Our findings suggest that different components of political risk command varying 
political risk premiums and that hedge returns in the emerging markets are higher; both 
findings are in line with Harvey (2004). Government Stability produces a negative hedge 
return in the all-country sample, whereas Socioeconomic Conditions produce the highest 
positive hedge return in the all-country sample. Ethnic Tensions contribute with a positive 
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hedge return of 5.606% p.a., of which 6.734% p.a. is related to the emerging markets. A 
similar trend is detected for Religious Tensions.  
Moreover, the cross-sectional relations between the country's total equity risk 
premiums,v estimated by Damodaran (2016), and underlying dimensions of political risk are 
examined. In the case of the emerging markets,vi there does not seem to be any relation at all 
except with Tension, which shows a negative correlation. This suggests that increased 
political risk is associated with an increased risk premium, in line with Harvey (2004). In the 
case of the developed markets, both Legal and Policy correlate negatively with the country’s 
total equity risk premium. The opposite trend is observed for Tension, further in line with 
Harvey (2004).  
These preliminary analyses confirm our assumption that the aggregated PRI is too 
coarse because there seems to be differences between both components and dimensions. 
Tension (ethnic and religious) is noted as an important and distinct dimension, which is the 
political risk aspect that is rewarded. This conflicts with previous research which highlights 
the social aspect of political risk in general.  
4.2. Analysis step two: Two-way Error Component Model 
We extend the multifactor model of Chen et al. (1986) in various ways. First, we identify the 
incremental effect of each underlying dimension of political risk resulting in five different 
model specifications. Second, the hypotheses are addressed by introducing interaction terms 
between the political risk dimensions and both market and time separately, resulting in two 
different model specifications (no. 6 and 7). Finally, the main model (no. 8) seeks to address 
the main question by including the interaction terms of both market and time simultaneously. 
Significantly negative coefficients for the underlying dimensions of political risk reflect a 
positive risk-return relation according to the construction of the rating system where a low 
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(high) rating indicates high (low) risk. Significantly positive coefficients will violate the 
classical risk-return relation.  
We present the results of introducing one underlying dimension of political risk at a 
time in Table 2. Legal is significantly positive in models 2, 3 and-4. In model 5, Legal is 
insignificant, whereas Policy is significantly negative. Two of twelve political risk 
components load moderately on the dimensions ad illustrated in section 3.2. Both dimensions 
are considered positively related to economic growth in Berggren et al. (2012). As such, 
Legal and Policy are likely to reflect partially similar dimensions of political risk. However, 
the markets seem more differentiated with respect to Legal, as the significance level of the 
market-fixed effectvii deteriorates in model 5. The time-fixed effect is highly significant 
during all model specifications.  
 
Table 2. The two-way error component model  
Estimates of Fixed Effects Including Type III Tests of Fixed Effects 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Variables Estimates 
Estimates of Intercept   
Intercept .0024 
(.0018) 
.0043 
(.0020) 
.0039 
(.0020) 
0,0038 
(.0020) 
0,0012 
(.0023) 
μ -.0033** 
(.0016) 
-.0072*** 
(.0024) 
-.0064*** 
(.0024) 
-.0063** 
(.0025) 
-.0043* 
(.0026) 
λ1 .0104*** 
(.0023) 
.0052*** 
(.0019) 
.0061*** 
(.0019) 
.0062*** 
(.0019) 
.0090*** 
(.0022) 
λ2 -.0040* 
(.0022) 
-.0064*** 
(.0021) 
-.0064*** 
(.0021) 
-.0063** 
(.0021) 
-.0049** 
(.0021) 
Estimates of Independent Variables   
RP 1.0400*** 
(.0149) 
1.0404*** 
(.0150) 
1.0560*** 
(.0150) 
1.0560*** 
(.0150) 
1.0556*** 
(.0150) 
TS -.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
CPI .5683** 
(.2478) 
.5424** 
(.2480) 
.5282** 
(.2490) 
.5268** 
(.2491) 
.5166** 
(.2490) 
IP .1692*** 
(.0293) 
.1680*** 
(.0293) 
.1675*** 
(.0291) 
.1675*** 
(.0292) 
.1688*** 
(.0290) 
Legal  .0027** 
(.0012) 
.0022** 
(.0012) 
.0021* 
(.0012) 
.0015 
(.0012) 
Tension  
 
-.0011 -.0011 -.0013 
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(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) 
Conflict  
  
-.0001 
(.0008) 
-.0003 
(.0008) 
Policy  
   
-.0023** 
(.0010) 
Significance Level of Fixed Effects  
Market   .041** .002*** .000*** .009*** .096* 
Time .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
Information Criteria    
AIC -14076 -14079 -14059 -14057 -14061 
BIC -14018 -14015 -13988 -13980 -13977 
N 4732 4732 4704 4704 4704 
Notes: Includes the extended multifactor model of Chen et al. (1986), introducing one underlying 
dimension of political risk at a time, using maximum likelihood. The standard error is reported 
beneath each estimate. The emerging market and the latter time-period are set as redundant variables. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. μ (λ) denotes dummy 
for market (time). Dependent variable: Excess return. The sample period spans from June 2001 to 
May 2015. 
 
We investigate the impact of the market in interaction with underlying dimensions of political 
risk to identify whether the dimensions affect excess returns differently between markets. The 
results are presented as model 6 in Table 3. The market-fixed effect is significant whereas the 
time-fixed effect is highly significant. Policy seems to be derived from the market effect, 
given the highly significant interaction term, as Legal turns significant. The effect of Policy is 
positive (negative) in the emerging (developed) markets. Hence, Policy affects excess return 
differently across markets and provides empirical support for the first hypothesis.  
 
Table 3. The two-way error component  
Estimates of Fixed Effects Including Type III Tests of Fixed Effects 
Model 6 7 8 
Variables Estimates 
Estimates of Intercept   
Intercept .0008 
(.0027) 
.0023 
(.0023) 
.0015 
(.0028) 
μ -.0058** 
(.0027) 
-.0017 
(.0027) 
-0,0022 
(.0029) 
λ1 .0104*** 
(.0023) 
.0098*** 
(.0023) 
.0109*** 
(.0024) 
λ2 -.0040* 
(.0022) 
-.0068*** 
(.0023) 
-.0061*** 
(.0023) 
Estimates of Independent Variables  
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RP 1.0552*** 
(.0150) 
1.0571*** 
(.0150) 
1.0568*** 
(.0149) 
TS -.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
-.0007*** 
(.0002) 
CPI .5271** 
(.2494) 
.4685* 
(.2484) 
.4824* 
(.2489) 
IP .1665*** 
(.0291) 
.1674*** 
(.0290) 
.1657*** 
(.0290) 
Legal .0011** 
(.0019) 
.0035 
(.0019) 
.0011 
(.0024) 
Tension -.0013 
(.0010) 
-.0013* 
(.0014) 
-.0016* 
(.0016) 
Conflict .0007 
(.0011) 
0,0000 
(.0015) 
.0008* 
(.0016) 
Policy .0006** 
(.0015) 
0,0016 
(.0016) 
.0042 
(.0020) 
Estimates of Market-specific Interaction Terms  
δDM,Legal .0031 
(.0026) 
 
.0035 
(.0026) 
δDM,Tension .0003 
(.0018) 
 
.0001 
(.0018) 
δDM,Conflict -.0025 
(.0020) 
 
-.0030* 
(.0017) 
δDM,Policy -.0062*** 
(.0018) 
 
-.0052*** 
(.0019) 
Significance Level of Time-specific Interaction Terms 
ρT,Legal .0250** .1690  
ρT,Tension .7590 .5930  
ρT,Conflict .0560* .0520*  
ρT,Policy .0000*** .0000***  
Estimates of Time-specific Interaction Terms    
ρT1,Legal 
 
-.0047** 
(.0019) 
-.0023 
(.0021) 
ρT2,Legal 
 
-.0052** 
(.0023) 
-.0043* 
(.0023) 
ρT1,Tension 
 
.0005 
(.0019) 
.0011 
(.0020) 
ρT2,Tension 
 
-.0009 
(.0020) 
-.0008 
(.0020) 
ρT1,Conflict 
 
.0005 
(.0019) 
.0012 
(.0020) 
ρT2,Conflict 
 
-.0041* 
(.0022) 
-.0035 
(.0022) 
ρT1,Policy 
 
-.0105*** 
(.0022) 
-.0107*** 
(.0022) 
ρT2,Policy 
 
.0015 
(.0026) 
.0008 
(.0026) 
Significance Level of Fixed Effects   
Market .035** .539 .438 
Time .000*** .000*** .000*** 
Information Criteria    
AIC -14073 -14091 -14098 
BIC -13963 -13955 -13937 
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N 4704 4704 4732 
Notes: This model includes the extended multifactor model of Chen et al. (1986), using maximum 
likelihood. Model 6 reports the model including interaction terms between the underlying dimensions 
of political risk and market. Model 7 reports the model including interaction terms between the 
underlying dimensions of political risk and time. Model 8 combines both interaction terms. The 
standard error is reported beneath each estimate. The emerging market and the latter time-period are 
set as redundant variables. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. δ (ρ) denotes market-specific (time-specific) interaction terms. μ (λ) denotes dummy for 
market (time). The sample period spans from June 2001 to May 2015. 
 
We investigate the impact of time in interaction with underlying dimensions of political risk 
to identify whether the dimensions affect excess returns differently over time. The results are 
presented as model 7 in Table 3. In cases where the interaction term with respect to time 
becomes significant in the Type III tests of fixed effects, it is not necessarily possible to 
reveal which period is significant compared to another. This applies especially in cases where 
the significance level is close to 0.05. The highly significant time-fixed effect overrules the 
market-fixed effect, possibly as a result of severe changes in the country’s politics during and 
after the global financial crisis (Hoshi, 2011). Furthermore, the global convergence finally 
seems present, indicating a correlation across markets with respect to the underlying 
dimensions of political risk. Only the main effect of Tension is (weakly) significant. However, 
the effects are significant in interaction with time in the case of Policy, Legal, and Conflict 
(0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively), i.e. they affect excess returns differently over time, 
ultimately leading to negative coefficients in the first sub-periods. This provides strong 
empirical support for the second hypothesis. 
The main model is specified by equation (1), and the results are presented in model 8 
in Table 3. The underlying dimensions of political risk, except from Legal,viii are significant 
in one way or another. The control variables are highly significant, except for CPI, which is 
weakly significant. The time-fixed effect is highly significant, whereas the market-fixed effect 
is not. The main effects of Tension and Conflict are weakly significant in addition to both 
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interaction terms with respect to Conflict. Policy is highly significant in interaction with both 
time and market, indicating that the interaction terms overrule the main effect.  
4.3. Discussion 
Tension is the only variable that becomes significantly negative across markets and over time, 
indicating that this is an economic state variable that systematically contributes with a 
positive correlation to stock market excess returns. Excess return is expected to decrease 
0.156% in month t given a unit increase in month t-1 (i.e., decreased risk), ceteris paribus. 
Conflict correlates negatively with stock market excess returns in the emerging 
market. Excess returns are expected to decrease 0.22% (note that the interaction term must be 
included) in month t given a unit increase in month t-1 (i.e. decreased risk), ceteris paribus, in 
the case of the developed market in the latter sub-period. The developed market differs 
significantly from the emerging market and contributes with a 0.30% decrease in excess 
returns. The results are in line with Harvey (2004), who suggests ‘External Conflict’ and 
‘Internal Conflict’ are drivers of positive hedge returns in the developed market, whereas the 
impacts in the emerging market are conflicting. The social aspect of political risk (in the 
meaning of both Tension and Conflict) contribute consistently to increased excess returns in 
developed markets. In emerging markets, Tension has a larger impact on excess returns than 
Conflict. The two coefficients further contribute with opposite signs, ultimately suggesting 
distinct underlying dimensions of political risk. This is in contrast to Toft (2008), Berggren et 
al. (2012, 2015) and Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015). The social aspect of political risk is 
suggested to be negatively related to both growth and return (Berggren et al., 2012; Lehkonen 
and Heimonen, 2015). Hence, the effect of Conflict could possibly outperform the effect of 
Tension and thus result in an overall negative relation, contributing to an understanding of the 
political risk sign paradox. Finally, our findings support the social aspect of political risk as 
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an important dimension. However, the impact of Tension and Conflict differ, making the 
dimensions highly important to consider separately. 
Concerning Policy, we see that excess returns are expected to decrease 1.178% in 
month t, given a unit increase in month t (i.e. decreased risk), ceteris paribus, in the case of 
the developed market in the first sub-period. The positive correlation contradicts the findings 
of Dimic et al. (2015). Furthermore, the pre-crisis period differs significantly from the post-
crisis period, leading to a significant decrease in the impact of Policy. This is consistent with 
the shift in the declining trend of Policy. This trend is somewhat more prominent in the 
developed market, possibly explaining why the market differs significantly from the emerging 
market, contributing with a 0.519% decrease in excess returns. The negative correlation in the 
emerging market during the latter periods is in line with Berggren et al. (2012), who suggest a 
negative relation between ‘Policy’ and economic growth in poor countries.  
Finally, Legal turns insignificant, in line with Dimic et al. (2015). Nevertheless, Legal 
varies significantly during the global financial crisis compared to the other periods, implying 
that a certain risk level is necessary to obtain a risk premium. Legal is also significantly 
positive during several model specifications as illustrated in Table 2. Hence, Legal is 
apparently an important political risk factor.  
In sum, our analysis indicates underlying dimensions of political risk are economic 
state variables Tension, Conflict, and Policy, systematically affecting stock market excess 
returns. Tension affects excess returns positively both across markets and over time, in line 
with the classical risk-return relation. Both Conflict and Policy vary across markets and over 
time, leading to a positive (negative) risk-return relation with excess return in the case of 
developed (emerging) markets. Hence, underlying dimensions of political risk affect stock 
market excess returns differently, which is in line with the expectations in Hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, we observe that political risk has additionally increased in general during the 
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21st century, something which could be explained by emerging markets’ increasing influence 
on the world economy. This trend is especially prominent in terms of Policy in the developed 
market, where investors seem to be rewarded in terms of both Policy and Conflict. These 
dimensions vary both across markets and over time, confirming both hypotheses. However, 
when assessing the interaction terms separately, only Policy varies between markets. All 
dimensions, except Tension, vary over time. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.4 Limitations 
A word of caution is, however, warranted. First, the results may be biased resulting from the 
omission of countries with extreme values of political risk due the availability of the 
macroeconomic factors. Choosing control variables from the criterion of availability could 
have led to an even larger sample size, as in Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015). A larger sample 
size would further allow computing factor prices in addition to factor-specific loadings, 
following the two-step regression of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Second, a linear model may 
not be appropriate because of non-symmetric data and weak relations between the underlying 
dimensions of political risk and excess return. Using quantile regression would offer a richer 
insight into the entire distribution of the dependent variable. Information lags are furthermore 
likely to vary across both countries and markets (Bilson, 2001). Specifying a model for each 
market could thus be more appropriate. However, if we had done so, we would have lost the 
ability to test for significant differences between markets. Third, because it may be 
challenging to distinguish political risk from country-specific risk (Jakobsen, 2012b), 
including both the economic and financial aspects from ICRG, this could have led to an even 
richer insight into the dimensions of political risk. 
Finally, we acknowledge that using the US Treasury bond as a risk-free rate results in 
some problems as excess equity returns in each particular country entail currency risk which 
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the US Treasury bond yield does not have. Foreign exchange (FX) risk could affect stock 
market returns, especially in cases of large and sudden exchange rate changes. Our model is 
not able to capture the FX exposure for equity premium.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
Our study acknowledges the multidimensional nature of political risk and contributes to an 
understanding of the political risk sign paradox. We managed to operationalize political risk 
into four distinct dimensions which we show to be a contribution in itself. Moreover, we 
identify Tension, representing Ethnic and Religious Tensions, which improves the 
understanding of political risk reward compared to previous research, highlighting the social 
aspect of political risk in general. We clearly show how aggregated political risk measures are 
too coarse for both analytical and investment purposes. 
 
Political risk has increased in general throughout the 21st century and recent developments in 
the international political arena have actualised this topic more than ever. However, stock 
market excess returns are highly context-sensitive as underlying dimensions of political risk 
affect stock market excess returns differently, thereby answering the main question of the 
study and posing great challenges for global investors. Although the total risk is what matters, 
an implication of this study is that internationally oriented investors are likely to benefit from 
knowledge regarding which of the dimensions implies a reward. Investors in particular should 
direct their attention towards Tension, which seems to command a risk premium regardless of 
both market and time.  
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Future research should pursue the findings of this study by constructing portfolios that 
implement this knowledge in order to be more normative in explaining how to achieve excess 
returns.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 4. Countries included in the sample  
 Index/class. IP Long-term Interest Rate Short-term Interest Rate 
Developed Market     
Belgium MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Canada MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Finland MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
France MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Germany MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Ireland MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Italy MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Japan MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Netherlands MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Norway MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Portugal MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Spain MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Sweden MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
United Kingdom MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
United States MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Emerging Market     
Czech Republic MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Greece MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Hungary MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
India MSCI WB DS* DS* 
Korea, South MSCI IFS IFS OECD 
Latvia S&P WB IFS OECD 
Malaysia MSCI WB IFS OECD 
Mexico MSCI IFS DS* IFS 
Philippines MSCI WB DS* DS* 
Poland MSCI IFS IFS IFS 
Slovakia S&P IFS IFS IFS 
South Africa MSCI WB IFS IFS 
Thailand MSCI WB IFS DS* 
 
Notes: All countries included in the sample, classified by market. Latvia and Slovakia are the only 
countries classified as frontier by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and are thereby 
reclassified as emerging, following the criteria of MSCI (2015), in order to obtain similar sized 
groups. The MSCI classifications are collected from MSCI (2016), while the Standard & Poor’s 
classifications are collected from S&P Dow Jones Indices (2013). Both Risk Premia (MSCI All 
Country World Index) and Inflation (The World Bank) are collected from the same source for all 
countries. Explanations of abbreviations: Industrial Production (IP), The World Bank (WB), 
Datastream (DS), International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the Organisation for Economic Co-
31 
 
operation and Development (OECD). The long-term rates account for at least five years, while the 
short-term rates account for one year or less. 
* Sources: Reserve Bank of India (long-term interest rate of India), Kanji Pitamber & Co (short-term 
interest rate of India), OECD (long-term interest rate of Mexico), Banko sentral ng philipinas (long-
term interest rate of Philippines), bureau of the treasury - republic of the Philippines (short-term 
interest rate of Philippines), Bank of Thailand (short-term interest rate of Thailand). 
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Appendix 2 
Table 5. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables   
 Mean Med. Std.dev. Var. Skew. Kurt. Min. Max. JB ADF 
Dependent Variable 
ER .00 .01 .08 .01 -.74 3.75 -.56 .44 538 -47 
Independent Variables 
Legal .00 .01 1.00 1.00 -.48 -.40 -2.93 1.74 2463  
Tension .00 .13 1.00 1.00 -.55 .26 -3.33 2.29 1723  
Conflict .00 .30 1.00 1.00 -.87 .27 -4.21 1.78 2074  
Policy .00 .04 1.00 1.00 -.21 .11 -3.15 3.03 1678  
RP .00 .00 .05 .00 .25 2.35 -.19 0.20 134 -48 
TS .05 -.15 4.45 19.82 -.78 248.21 -120.44 120.04 1*10^7 -54 
CPI .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 10.09 -.03 0.04 10699 -25 
IP .00 .00 .03 .00 -.69 13.79 -.31 0.22 23312 -60 
Political Risk Components 
BQ 3.30 3.00 .64 .41 -.26 -.98 2.00 4.00 3175  
C 3.44 3.00 1.22 1.49 .37 -1.09 1.50 6.00 3402  
DA 5.61 6.00 .65 .43 -2.25 6.87 2.00 6.00 6928  
ET 4.30 4.00 1.10 1.21 -.03 -.87 2.00 6.00 2949  
EC 10.41 10.50 1.10 1.21 -1.34 2.58 4.50 12.00 1457  
GS 7.75 7.50 1.46 2.12 -.03 -.36 3.50 12.00 2223  
IC 9.93 10.00 1.28 1.64 -.84 .32 6.00 12.00 1979  
IP 10.51 11.00 1.53 2.35 -.86 -.38 6.00 12.00 2836  
LO 4.61 5.00 1.15 1.33 -.79 -.08 1.00 6.00 2370  
MP 5.28 6.00 0.92 .84 -1.20 .79 2.00 6.00 2092  
RT 4.94 5.00 1.07 1.15 -1.29 1.21 1.00 6.00 1944  
SC 7.75 8.00 1.74 3.03 -.41 -.43 3.50 11.00 2446  
PRI 77.81 78.00 8.73 76.17 -.45 -.21 51.50 96.50 2186  
Notes. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables including the twelve components of the 
Political Risk index (International Country Risk Guide). Dependent variable: Excess Return (ER). Independent 
variables: Risk Premia (RP), Term Structure (TS), Inflation (CPI), and Industrial Production (IP). Political risk 
components: Political Risk Index (PRI), Bureaucracy Quality (BQ), Corruption (C), Democratic Accountability 
(DA), Ethnic Tension (ET), External Conflict (ET), Government Stability (GS), Internal Conflict (IC), 
Investment Profile (IP), Law and Order (LO), Military in Politics (MP), Religious Tensions (RT), and 
Socioeconomic Conditions (SC). JB (ADF) denotes Jarque-Bera (Augmented Dickey Fuller). The sample period 
spans from May 2001 to May 2015. N = 4732. 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix of the dependent variable (ER) and independent variables. 
Explanations of abbreviations: Excess Return (ER), Risk Premia (RP), Term Structure (TS), 
Inflation (CPI), and Industrial Production (IP). The sample period spans from May 2001 to May 
2015. 
 
RP TS CPI IP Legal Tension Conflict Policy ER 
RP 1 .006 -.034 -.002 -.013 -.001 .007 .021 .709 
TS .006 1 -.060 -.039 -.004 .007 .007 .016 -.043 
CPI -.034 -.060 1 .030 -.141 -.150 -.049 -.017 .009 
IP -.002 -.039 .030 1 -.024 -.014 -.003 .013 .063 
Legal -.013 -.004 -.141 -.024 1 .000 .000 .000 -.019 
Tension -.001 .007 -.150 -.014 .000 1 .000 .000 -020 
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Conflict .007 .007 -.049 -.003 .000 .000 1 .000 .000 
Policy .021 .016 -.017 .012 .000 .000 .000 1 .001 
ER .709 -.043 .009 .063 -.019 -.020 .000 .001 1 
 
 
 
i The 10-year US Treasury Bond rate is converted from annual to monthly and serve as a proxy for a risk-free 
rate. Excess return is considered in terms of an investor with a long-term investment horizon. These assumptions 
and calculations also apply for RP. Using a long-term interest rate can lead to several possible pitfalls. First, a 
long-term interest rate holds a weaker correlation with the stock market compared to short-term interest rates. 
Second, it may hold more liquidity and default risk compared to short-term interest rates. 
ii Further testing using two orthogonal (quartimax and equamax) and two oblique (promax and direct oblimin) 
rotations do not affect the loadings, therefore the dimensions turn out robust, and the principal components are not 
correlated. The underlying dimensions of political risk as such reflect distinct constructs. 
iii The Hausman Test of the baseline model (excluding interaction terms), comparing fixed with random effects 
(country-fixed and time-fixed effects), gives χ2 = 25.702, corresponding to a p-value of 0.001 (df = 8). 
Consequently, the random effect is not consistent, and the fixed effect would be the most suitable model for the 
data. The statistical software in use does not allow testing for market-fixed effects. 
iv The results of these preliminary analyses are available upon request. 
v The data and further descriptions are available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. 
vi Greece is not included in the emerging market sample because of an extremely high total equity risk premium, 
disturbing the analysis. 
vii When replacing the market-fixed effect with country-fixed effect, the latter effect is not significant when 
considering the simple multifactor model. The country-fixed effect is highly significant when introducing the first 
underlying dimension of political risk and remains so when further underlying dimensions are included. 
viii However, the second sub-period differs significantly from the latter in the case of Legal. 
                                                 
